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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to sketch a possible approach on several problems of philosophical historiography. If the 
propositions used by the historians of philosophy are truth-bearers, then there should be an underlying theory of truth for each 
approach. The paper discusses the case of the coherence theory of truth through the main criteria, consistency, and sets 
general lines for future possible developments. 
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1.  Introduction 
Before discussing the akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes his own method. 
 possible, the truth of 
all reputable opinions about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both resolve the 
Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1, 1145b1-8. 
Tr. W.D. Ross, J.O. Urmson (rev.). 
of predecessors or contemporaries (endoxa) and trying the find a solution that saves most of these opinions once 
a consistent view on the researched problem has been found. This manner of discussing philosophical problems is 
still in use and many analytic philosophers are introducing past philosophies to nowadays debates for just this 
purpose: to see if they can provide a pertinent answer to the problem (given that the required criteria of clarity 
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and validity are respected). When dealing with other authors, we can observe that Aristotle, as well as 
contemporary scholars, submits to what is ca  Following this principle, we should 
f 
knowledge. Every person who wants to understand the world (natural philosopher, physicist) needs to assume 
that the world is rational to some extent and so it can be investigated in a rational manner. The works of past 
philosophers are part of the world and when we are focusing our research on them, we need to assume the same 
thing. It follows that the works of the philosophers and the works of the historians of philosophy have in common 
several common principles (or at least they should). 
2. Two models  
There are two standard models of doing history of philosophy: analytical and contextual [1]. There are other 
ways of classifying the approaches (e.g. [2] distinguishes between historicist and positivist approaches), but 
broadly considered, we have two models, opposed in certain aspects.   
The chief argument for practicing history of philosophy in an analytical way is that the philosophies of the 
past can be useful when addressing actual philosophical problems (e.g. in ethics or politics). There are certain 
prerequisites that an analytical history strives to meet. The past authors need to conform to the same principles 
(validity, clarity, etc.) to which the texts written by the contemporary analytical philosophers conform. If the past 
author does not comply, the  if possible, in order to gain relevance for the 
investigated problem. Therefore, the main purpose is not to know something about the past philosopher or to 
interpret his texts, but to see if his arguments for a certain thesis regarding a specific problem are appropriate. 
When one wants to validate an argument then it must show that the argument considered is consistent with the 
principles of logic and valid reasoning. This means that the standard in this case is logical in nature and thus 
conforming to it means conforming to logical principles. This is why analytic historians of philosophy tend to use 
mostly evaluative phrases in their research. 
Theoretically, one can distinguish two types of analytical standards when dealing with arguments of past 
philosophers: the weak analytical model  the arguments should only be valid  and the strong analytical model  
the arguments need to be sound. If soundness in argument had been a main condition to be met, then most of the 
philosophers would not be studied at all. 
The contextual approach is employed by the historian of philosophy whose main purpose is to understand the 
-matters, of 
premises, of arguments etc. There may be several levels of context. For instance, when we want to understand a 
proposition p written by the author X, then we can have in mind the following levels of context: the argument, if 
any, in which p is either a premise, or a conclusion; the paragraph; the chapter; the entire text; the whole corpus, 
or parts of the corpus, 
 in Garber [3]). 
While the analytical historian of philosophy respects only one standard (the logical one), the contextual 
historian needs to be aware of the fact that it is possible that past authors used other standards, and in order to 
understand their texts, one needs to reco  data gathered from contextual 
sources. There are, of course, failures in reconstructing the standard, but, if certain precautions are taken, we can 
reduce their occurrence. Naturally, the importance of context can be overestimated to the point where the use of 
context degenerate [4]. 
 
 
 
72   Iovan Drehe /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  71 ( 2013 )  70 – 75 
3.  Propositions 
Given the fact that historians of philosophy consider their work as a form of knowledge, it is obvious that the 
bulk of the propositions employed are truth-bearers. Therefore, the truth-value of these propositions is to be 
evaluated having in mind different criteria, depending on the truth theory we consider appropriate in each 
particular case. There are three types of propositions: descriptive, exegetical and evaluative [2].  
In what follows, a simplified model for an analytical approach will be considered: 
 
Fig. 1. model for the analytical approach 
 
In the philosophical text, the historian of philosophy works with two types of propositions: explicit (S) and 
implicit (P). S appears in the text and P can be inferred based on S or we can reach S based on P. The historian of 
philosophy (HP) can employ at least descriptive propositions (D) and interpretative propositions (I). By using D 
the HP refers to S and by using I to P. 
The truth of D can be verified by correspondence to S (D 
cannot be verified in the same manner (I 
why we need to determine  Therefore,  P should not 
contradict any S (since S can be implied by P or the other way around), i.e. P should be consistent with all the S 
propositions.  
We continue now with the evaluative propositions (E). We can evaluate either a philosophical text (E1) or we 
can evaluate an exegetical one (E2). E1 can be about S, P or about possible relations between them. E2 can be 
about D, I, their relations to S and P, and possible relations between D and I. However, regarding E, there is a 
problem about evaluating the truth-value. In the case of the analytical model of doing history of philosophy, the 
S S 
P P 
S 
I I 
D D D 
73 Iovan Drehe /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  71 ( 2013 )  70 – 75 
solution is simple. For example, E about S-P is true if the observed consistency/inconsistency between S and P 
types of propositions exists. 
But what if the considered text is not written following the exact criteria for consistency that the analytical 
historian of philosophy has in mind? If this is the case, then we can miss evaluation of the text and even the 
interpretation of it, since P may be consistent with S in other manners. Since it is obvious that there are certain 
relations between propositions, the nature of these relations needs to be given some consideration. The analytical 
historian of philosophy seems inclined to consider that these relations are logical in nature, but there is the 
possibility that they are of a different nature (not necessary entirely different). 
4.  Consistency 
The analytical model operates with a clear, specific type of consistency, namely logical consistency. This is 
the criterion or standard by which a text is considered philosophical and has its so-called place in the history of 
philosophy: if it is logically consistent, then it is philosophical. What if there is no logical consistency between S 
propositions, or between S and P propositions? One would be inclined to consider the text as non-philosophical. 
However, this would mean that a whole lot of texts of philosophical importance would be excluded from the 
canon. Even more if logical soundness becomes the main criterion, as stated above. 
If the text does not comply with logical standards, then there are a few possible answers to this situation. 
Either the text is indeed built on logical standards, but fails to deliver the expected results, or our criterion of 
consistency is inappropriate in relation to the considered text. If we are dealing with the second case, then the 
criterion that needs revision is the one that states that a philosophical text needs to be consistent. 
This may be achieved by considering t  
over time  is only a particular case. To assume that 
every text complies with the logical standard is an error that may lead to other serious errors. So the problem 
becomes: what standard of consistency is employed in the studied text? In many cases it is not easy to answer this 
question. 
There is a possibility that the author states his rules and principles of argument in the same text with the 
analyzed propositions. However, this is seldom the case. The historian of philosophy needs to reconstruct them 
and for this he needs to have in mind the context. If so, the result is that the above figure needs to be extended 
and thus many more relations that are possible become apparent. 
5.  Inconsistency 
Even with the principle of charity in mind, there are cases when inconsistencies are found. What role do 
inconsistencies play in this tableau? Identification of inconsistencies plays a crucial role: this is how change in 
the history of philosophy is explained and interpreted. In the case of an analytical approach, when an 
inconsistency is found, the verdict is that the philosophical piece taken into account is not relevant (or relevant as 
an example of bad philosophical practice). However, the context needs to be considered even when logical 
inconsistencies, or of any kind, are found. It very well may be the case that the respective philosophical text, even 
if it contains errors, had an influence on the consequent tradition and then it can be of use in explaining certain 
premises, in accordance with ex falso quodlibet). On the other hand, an approach that overstates the principle of 
charity can lead the researcher to think that he failed to understand the text. The principle of charity is also used 
when the different levels of contextual explanation are considered. In this case, an abuse of the principle of 
charity can lead to undesired results: one can observe change, but, since no inconsistencies exist (if the principle 
of charity is followed), the change cannot be explained. So, to summarize, if we find an inconsistency this may 
indicate several possible reasons: 
74   Iovan Drehe /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  71 ( 2013 )  70 – 75 
1. There is indeed an error committed by the author. 
2. There is a failure in interpretation. 
3. There is a change  
6.   
 I understand the process of presenting the philosophical text of the past in such a manner 
that the contemporary reader can understand it. Since history of philosophy as a discipline has a claim of 
knowledge, it must conform to the actual standards of argumentative discourse. The claims need to be clear, the 
deductions valid. Now, regarding the analytical model, if the relations of consistency exist, then there is no 
 the text. However, if the case is that the philosophical text is built upon different 
standards of consistency, then a problem appears. If the historian of philosophy presents the text using the same 
consistency standards from the original, then the relevance of the text as a scientific literature is minimal and it 
fails to provide even sensible more knowledge of the original text than the original text itself already does. 
The hypothetical case under consideration takes for granted the existence of two standards of consistency, 
existent on different levels (they may be the same): 
1. Consistency of the 1st kind: the standard of the past philosophical text (S-S, S-P, P-P). 
2. Consistency of the 2nd kind: the standard of the text written by the historian of philosophy (D-D, D-I, I-I). 
So where does the problem appear? In the figure from the third section of the present paper, we observed that 
between propositions there are relations of the following kind: 
1. Consistency: S-S; S-P; P-P; D-D; D-I; I-I. 
2. Correspondence: D-S. 
3. The case of I-P (i.e. correspondence based on consistency of the S-I type). 
Since this problem is specific to the relation between I and P, then it is clearly a problem of interpretation (this 
is why  is interpretation ). However, for the possibility of consistency 
between I and S propositions, there need to exist common features that make the relation possible. For now, as a 
hypothesis for further study, the relations between I and S type propositions should be approached on a semantic 
level and use many other tools provided by disciplines considered auxiliary in this case (e.g. classical studies, 
papyrology, paleography, lexicography etc.). 
7. Concluding remarks 
What is philosophically relevant with respect to the history of philosophy? Of course, in the analytical sense 
this is clear: past philosophies are a source of arguments and positions regarding actual philosophical problems. 
The main charge against the  is that it is too antiquarian, too historical. Even if we accept 
that contextual history of philosophy is antiquarian, this does not automatically rule out philosophical aspects of 
it. Contextual historians of philosophy also consider questions regarding their method (what is specific to it in 
contrast with the method of actual philosophical practice which may be logical) and seek to identify the relevant 
sources and the right tools of reflection.  
Should we consider philosophy to be somewhere in the middle between theology and modern science (as in 
[5]) then, in my opinion, history of philosophy is to be situated somewhere between philosophy and modern 
science. There should be no authority in the history of philosophy apart from the source texts. This means that, as 
any science, the contextual history of philosophy has a basis (source) of reasoning and has a method of reasoning. 
Its sources are empirical (source texts) and its method may very well be logical. 
 
 We do not have here in mind philosophical hermeneutics in the tradition of Heidegger, Gadamer and others. 
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It is possible that the distinction between analytic and contextual historians of philosophy does not really 
account for all the scholars that take interest in the study of the texts of past philosophers. There are many 
 that can be considered Hegelians, Heideggerians, psychoanalysts etc. and do not comply to the 
analytical standards of reasoning, but use the historical texts of philosophy in the same pragmatic manner: to 
address or justify philosophical problems of their own, in many cases absent from the intentions (let us not forget 
about phenomenological approaches either) of the past authors. So, the distinction should be made between 
models that approach the texts from the past using their own standards and the ones that try to reconstruct, as 
accurately as possible, the standard used by the past author. Analytic historians, however, have one essential 
characteristic, mentioned above: they comply with the logical standards of discourse. Thereby, the reverse 
question should be asked too: in what manner can analytic philosophy be of use to the history of philosophy? 
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